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ChinaFile

chinatasteny.com JSON

ChinaFile 168一分钟体彩极速赛车官方记录历史-超级赛车官网号直播-正规体彩极速数据查询:稳定福彩168+中国体彩网 极速车走势数据网上查询 168官方的历史记录极速显示 168体彩网记录结果查询极速赛车+快速75秒赛果直播... 会飞的赛车 well-designed platform on which they can encounter voices and topics that tend to be out of

Sources & updates
How this name was decided

the site's published name — stated on chinatasteny.com, x.com

Profile sources
Last observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:16 AM UTCFresh
Record last changed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:16 AM UTC
Observations
4,871
Sources read
26 of 27

This collection is not finished: 1 source (declared_live) could not be read.

Legal Entities & Relationships

2018States it has operated since
“She founded Tech Buzz China in 2018 to...” — chinatasteny.com
ChinaFile Visuals EditorWas formerly
“She is a Non-Resident Fellow at ChinaFile and was previously the ChinaFile Visuals Editor.” — chinatasteny.com
Relationship evidence

Identity revision 1, last changed

  • a declared affiliated site is a relationship the publisher states, not common ownership
  • a declared provider account (gift cards, hiring, ordering) is a service relationship, not an affiliation
  • a register party at the business's premises is a candidate operator until the Place and legal resolvers bind it
  • a licensed operator of the business's premises operates those locations; it is not thereby the brand's owner
  • an employer a job board names on the openings posts them; it is not thereby the owner or the operator
  • an app's store seller or developer publishes the app; neither is thereby the restaurant's owner
  • a menu that names a producer names it; it is not a supply contract, a volume or an exclusivity
  • a mail or DMARC service domain in DNS is a technical service relationship, not an affiliation
  • a group the site says it is part of is a public affiliation; the equity chain and buying rights are separate questions
  • an organization that posts the openings, sells the app or holds a program account shares services with the business; that is not affiliation or ownership
  • Published nameChinaFile
    Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com → declared og:site_name
    First observed
    Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
    Read from
    http://chinatasteny.com
  • Published descriptionChinaFile 168一分钟体彩极速赛车官方记录历史-超级赛车官网号直播-正规体彩极速数据查询:稳定福彩168+中国体彩网 极速车走势数据网上查询 168官方的历史记录极速显示 168体彩网记录结果查询极速赛车+快速75秒赛果直播... 会飞的赛车 well-designed platform on which they can encounter voices and topics that tend to be out of
    Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com/
    First observed
    Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
    Read from
    http://chinatasteny.com
  • Canonical URLhttp://chinatasteny.com/index.html
    Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com/
    First observed
    Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
    Read from
    http://chinatasteny.com
  • Site iconSite icon
    Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com/
    Read from
    http://chinatasteny.com

ChinaFile Employees & Ownership

Andrew Senyei
  • As printed The twenty-first century will be the century of biology, much as chemistry and physics dominated science and technology in the twentieth century. The biotech sector will become an important part of the U.S. economy. Bioeconomy already accounts for about 5 percent of the U.S. GDP today, or about U.S.$1 trillion per year; future biotech development promises to transform human lives and society around the world. As the world seeks tools to address the COVID-19 pandemic, innovation in biotechnology is the source of molecular diagnostics, antibody tests, therapeutics, and preventive vaccines. Recognizing its transformative power, China is investing a huge amount of resources in developing its biotech industry. China’s leaders have written biotech into the country’s national strategic plans. They are betting that China’s statist model will succeed in propelling China into a technological super power. China’s universities are graduating more STEM students than American colleges even though the U.S. still attracts a far greater amount of Chinese talent than the other way around. As the People’s Republic of China government looks for new economic growth points, China’s investment in biotechnology is poised to grow more in the coming years and decades. What should the U.S. do to remain competitive? First, the U.S. must work to maintain its leadership in biotechnology, an industry that it has dominated since it emerged in the 1970s. A loss of U.S. leadership in biotech will impact American competitiveness and security for sure. But perhaps more consequential is the weakening of the existing norms and institutions that underlie an open, ethical, and internationally collaborative enterprise in basic and applied biosciences research and biotech commercialization. The U.S. government must improve policy coordination at the highest level, update its IP laws to incentivize biotech productive development, develop next-generation manufacturing capabilities, and dedicate greater resources to training a competent, diverse, and innovation-minded workforce. Second, the United States must put in place vigorous but targeted measures to minimize the risks that accompany any international collaboration, including with Chinese institutions. The U.S. government must block illicit or forced tech transfers to China and counter harmful Chinese industrial practices that disadvantage American innovators and investors. We should also aggressively pursue greater reciprocal rules and harmonized standards for exchanging information and biomaterials. Finally, American policymakers should keep in mind the enormous benefits of U.S.-China collaboration in biotechnology for solving the world’s pressing medical and public health problems. As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, the world loses enormously from any political obstacles to international cooperation. Re-joining international organizations such as the WHO is the right thing to do, as is maintaining scientific collaboration with China on urgent or shared challenges, assuming appropriate risk mitigation processes and rules are in place at both federal and institutional levels. The stakes are simply too high for the U.S. and China to go their separate ways, especially in a highly connected world where pandemics do not recognize borders.
    Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com/how-can-us-maintain-global-leadership-science-and-technology.html → Published person (name and role labels)
    Published
    2020-11-18T08:08:53-05:00
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
Anja Manuel
  • As printed Even at the height of the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet scientists collaborated on openly publishable fundamental science research. Arthur Bienenstock took part in these collaborations. It is vital that the U.S. remain a leader in basic science. With the U.S. only performing about one quarter of the world’s research and development (R&D), international collaboration is an important part of our scientific enterprise. China is, by far, the primary nation with which U.S. researchers collaborate. We must maintain those collaborations, particularly in areas of common concern like climate change and pandemics. Yet, China’s huge, state-dominated economy, its questionable political and military intentions, and its slow progress in IP protection make it a formidable and threatening competitor. In recent years, there have been reports of researchers at U.S. universities inappropriately transferring ideas and IP to China, and of U.S. scientists’ failing to disclose Chinese funding and participation in Chinese government-run talent programs. A targeted approach to managing the risk such breaches pose is far better than closing our borders to collaboration with China and others. The following steps can help mitigate the risks of open and collaborative research: The U.S. visa-vetting system must have primary responsibility for screening out those deemed inappropriate for graduate studies to participate in research at U.S. universities. The government should exercise its responsibility in a manner that maximizes the access by U.S. universities and industries to talent without compromising national security. Highly sensitive research in dual-use areas should be classified and transferred from universities to national labs, which can vet researchers and protect IP better than universities. Openness requires honesty, transparency, and integrity. Universities should strengthen and rigorously implement conflict of interest, commitment policies, and vetting of foreign-funded projects while also providing relevant training in these areas to everyone from senior researchers to students. Finally, we must cooperate with our friends and allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region to ensure that they implement a similar risk-mitigation strategy. Finally, the U.S. must strengthen its R&D ecosystem by increasing funding for basic R&D, and it must continue attracting the world’s best talent to its universities and laboratories while growing a more diverse domestic pool of STEM talent. A strong commitment to openness, coupled with smart risk mitigation, is a sure road to maintaining American leadership in fundamental scientific research. Closing up the U.S. research system and stymying collaboration will harm the United States, causing us to fall behind and become a second-rate nation in science and technology.
    Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com/how-can-us-maintain-global-leadership-science-and-technology.html → Published person (name and role labels)
    Published
    2020-11-18T08:08:53-05:00
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
Arthur Bienenstock
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
Benjamin Liebmandirector
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
Chris WyattDirector
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
David Tangfounderlast seen

Roles

Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
Da Wei
  • As printed It’s true that China’s external environment has deteriorated since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Having said that, the role of the pandemic in the change in China’s strategic calculus should not be exaggerated. In 2018, almost two years before the coronavirus outbreak, the Chinese government began to use a new phrase to describe its external environment when Xi Jinping claimed that the world was experiencing “ profound changes unseen in a century .” From the Chinese government’s point of view, the world order has undergone dramatic changes in the last decade. New powers and players are emerging, and—particularly under the Trump administration—the U.S. is withdrawing from its leadership in the liberal world order. The existing world order which China has tried to integrate into and which it has benefited from has begun to disintegrate. As for China-U.S. relations, the Trump administration abandoned the long-term “engagement” strategy towards China and defined China as a “ strategic competitor ” in December 2017. The two countries waded into a trade war in 2018. The same year, the U.S. began its efforts to strangle Chinese hi-tech companies like ZTE and Huawei. These changes have brought huge uncertainties to, if not purely negative impacts on, China’s further development. COVID-19 has been an accelerant to changes in the Chinese government’s strategic calculus that were already long underway. The Chinese government does not have an incentive to maintain its internal stability by showing toughness externally. A survey conducted by Singapore-based independent pollster Blackbox Research found that out of people polled in 23 countries and regions, Chinese respondents were the most satisfied with their government’s COVID response. It’s completely wrong to think that the Chinese government is in a difficult position due to COVID-19. To link China’s international behavior to its domestic stability could be misleading. The distrust between China and the U.S. has heightened in recent years. When we have a strong view towards the other side, it is always very easy to “link the dots” from the other side’s behavior to support our biased belief. It is not hard for the China-bashers in the West to find those “dots,” but it’s also easy for the Chinese to do the same thing. In January and February 2020, when China was the only epicenter of the crisis, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross predicted that the epidemic could help return jobs to the U.S. U.S. media and Senator Tom Cotton began to engage in baseless speculation that COVID-19 is a man-made virus from a lab in Wuhan. Those “dots” were widely read in Chinese social media and many Chinese people naturally had the impression the U.S. was trying to exploit the crisis to weaken, stigmatize, and isolate China. When observers use the term “wolf warrior diplomacy” to describe China’s foreign policy during the crisis, my impression is that the majority of Chinese believe that China is in a defensive posture and their diplomats’ harsh comments against the U.S. are a legitimate attempt at self-defense. So again, it is completely wrong to think that China is using the difficult situation foreign countries are in because of the pandemic to expand its own strategic influence or gain strategic advantages. China of course wants a benign external environment. The challenge is that the environment itself is changing, and China cannot determine its trajectory. It takes two to tango. The next U.S. administration, no matter whether it is Republican or Democratic, will face a critical choice: whether it should pursue a healthy competition strategy or a zero-sum suppression strategy with China.
    Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com/has-covid-19-changed-how-chinas-leaders-approach-national-security.html → Published person (name and role labels)
    Published
    2020-06-03T14:32:58-04:00
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
Donald TrumpPresident
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
Elizbeth LoDirector
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
Evans RevereSenior Directorlast seen 2023-04-13
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC
Helen Toner
  • As printed Over the last decade, U.S. views of China’s technological prospects have shifted rapidly. After long dismissing China as a country of uncreative imitators, it’s good we’re now recognizing that Chinese research labs and tech companies alike are reaching the point where they can compete on the world stage. At the same time, in most areas it’s not accurate to claim that China has outstripped the United States, or that it soon will. In artificial intelligence (AI), for example, much has been made of the importance of data and the supposed advantage China draws from having access to the digital footprints of its 1.4 billion citizens. In reality, the strategic relevance of data is not so clear , nor is it obvious that China has access to more or better data in practice than, say, U.S.-based multinationals. Likewise, consternation that China now publishes more AI research papers or files more patents than the United States should be allayed by the fact that Chinese researchers are heavily incentivized to publish and patent rapidly rather than well, and that comprehensive assessments of national AI strength consistently put the United States on top. So, does this imply that the United States can coast on its current success? Of course not. What it means is that policies to support U.S. technological competitiveness should be based on a sober assessment of our relative strengths, rather than a simplistic fear of China surging ahead. The areas where the United States has an enduring advantage are not hard to find, once you look for them: deep alliances, world-class universities, a vibrant private sector, and the ability to draw brilliant researchers, engineers, and entrepreneurs from all around the world. Bolstering these strengths must be the core aim of U.S. technology policy. Where China attempts to exploit the openness of the U.S.-led system—for example, by stealing trade secrets or controlled technologies—targeted countermeasures are needed. But a technology strategy that focuses more on denying Chinese access than on building U.S. capacity is sure to fail. In 1972, the great strategist Andy Marshall wrote that the key question for U.S. planners in the Cold War should be, “How can the United States move the competition into areas where it has an advantage, or the Soviets a disadvantage?” Although the United States today faces a different competitor in a different kind of competition, that underlying question is still an excellent guide. U.S. strengths are substantial, and—if fostered, rather than neglected—put us in good stead for the decades to come.
    Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com/how-can-us-maintain-global-leadership-science-and-technology.html → Published person (name and role labels)
    Published
    2020-11-18T08:08:53-05:00
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:13 AM UTC
Ismail TiliwaldiChairmanlast seen 2018-05-11
Stated by 1 source
Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
1 person not confirmed

The latest people collection is incomplete. Previously confirmed people remain available with their original dates.

  • Sara Segal-Williams

    mailbox_without_role: a mailbox spells the name, and no role or contact purpose is printed beside it

    Source not recorded · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
    Observed via
    http://chinatasteny.com/about.html → Person candidate named on the business's own site page (no admission chain accepted it)

Job Postings

  • Careers page publishedhttps://www.chinafile.com/keyword/employment
    Directly observed
    Observed via
    https://www.chinafile.com/keyword/employment → the careers link the site labels, on another host; read — no opening was read from it
    Read from
    https://www.chinafile.com
  • Careers page publishedhttps://www.chinafile.com/keyword/jobs
    Directly observed
    Observed via
    https://www.chinafile.com/keyword/jobs → the careers link the site labels, on another host; read — no opening was read from it
    Read from
    https://www.chinafile.com
  • Hiring statusno open role: careers page read, no roles listed (2 pages); LinkedIn Jobs: https://www.linkedin.com/company/chinafilemagazine (organization 92735086) has no posting on LinkedIn Jobs; Indeed and ZipRecruiter not searched
    Derived from observations
    Observed via
    https://www.chinafile.com/keyword/employment → https://www.chinafile.com/keyword/jobs
    Read from
    https://www.chinafile.com

Contact Information

External references

Emails

books@chinafile.com

Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/books.html → address on another registrable domain — referenced, not the subject's contact point
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC

feedback@chinafile.com

Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/about.html → address on another registrable domain — referenced, not the subject's contact point
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC

editors@chinafile.com

Published by the company · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/about.html → address on another registrable domain — referenced, not the subject's contact point → printed beside it: "Write us a proposal of 600 words or fewer and send it (in the email body) to editors@chinafile.com ."
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:12 AM UTC
Contact forms

http://chinatasteny.com/beijing-putting-people-back-work-may-prove-tough-job.html

Directly observed · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/beijing-putting-people-back-work-may-prove-tough-job.html → form headed "Eva Xiao" → submits to http://chinatasteny.com/beijing-putting-people-back-work-may-prove-tough-job.html → purpose: contact (a field to write or be reached through)
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC

http://chinafile.us2.list-manage.com/subscribe/post?u=dd858a5b6e74ef23767d565ae&id=de2675ff34

Directly observed · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/beijing-putting-people-back-work-may-prove-tough-job.html → form headed "Eva Xiao" → submits to http://chinafile.us2.list-manage.com/subscribe/post?u=dd858a5b6e74ef23767d565ae&id=de2675ff34 → purpose: newsletter (a lone email input) → http://chinatasteny.com/chinafile-recommends.html → http://chinatasteny.com/contact.html → http://chinatasteny.com/generations-of-prc-leaders-world-alive-danger.html → http://chinatasteny.com/regulators-leave-wealth-management-industry-unplugged.html → http://chinatasteny.com/where-chinas-leaders-go-africa-may-surprise-you.html → http://chinatasteny.com → http://chinatasteny.com/ → http://chinatasteny.com/10-years-of-north-korea-challenge.html → http://chinatasteny.com/10-years-of-us-china-diplomacy.html → http://chinatasteny.com/10-years-of-us-china-trade-relations.html → http://chinatasteny.com/about.html → http://chinatasteny.com/american-company-sold-dna-analysis-equipment-security-officials-xinjiang.html → http://chinatasteny.com/another-problem-chinas-coal-mercury-rice.html → http://chinatasteny.com/anti-corruption-campaign-takes-war-pollution.html → http://chinatasteny.com/appeasement-cineplex.html → http://chinatasteny.com/appliances-are-listening.html → http://chinatasteny.com/are-chinas-blue-skies-here-stay.html → http://chinatasteny.com/arts.html → http://chinatasteny.com/beginning-of-end-zero-covid.html → http://chinatasteny.com/behind-exodus-of-us-law-firms-china.html → http://chinatasteny.com/beijing-changing-tack-big-tech.html → http://chinatasteny.com/beijings-long-struggle-control-xinjiangs-mineral-wealth.html → http://chinatasteny.com/beijings-skinheads.html → http://chinatasteny.com/black-panther-sparks-debate-over-anti-black-racism-china.html → http://chinatasteny.com/books.html → http://chinatasteny.com/business.html → http://chinatasteny.com/caixin-media.html → http://chinatasteny.com/can-chinese-payment-apps-gain-traction-globally.html → http://chinatasteny.com/can-new-us-law-prevent-uyghur-forced-labor.html → http://chinatasteny.com/carbon-monoxide-poisoning-kills-more-100-china-year.html → http://chinatasteny.com/cautioning-his-students-stay-quiet-scholar-of-china-hears-echoes.html → http://chinatasteny.com/central-and-regional-leadership-xinjiang-policy-xis-second-term.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-africa-project.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-and-philippines-will-work-together-tap-south-china-seas-vast-oil-deposits.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-fueling-new-resource-curse-and-riots-around-world.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-gave-trump-list-of-crazy-demands-and-he-caved-one-of-them.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-needs-more-water-so-its-building-rain-making-network-three-times-size-of-spain-0.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-nuclear-bomb-60-years.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-plans-kill-local-subsidies-electric-cars.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-regulatory-crackdown.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-russia-relations-dawn-of-biden-era.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-saudi-rmb-settlement-will-insulate-oil-trade-us-sanctions.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-unveils-ambitious-plan-curb-climate-change-emissions.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-upping-its-aid-and-development-game-how-should-us-respond.html → http://chinatasteny.com/china-world-podcast.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinafile-conversation.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinafile-presents-china-reporting-exile.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinafile-presents-made-ethiopia.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinas-birth-crisis-crisis-of-faith-future.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinas-new-deserts.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinas-next-act.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinas-record-urban-youth-unemployment.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinas-role-sri-lankas-debt-crisis.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinas-second-continent.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinas-vulnerability-paradox.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chinese-lawyers-chinese-lawmakers-let-us-defend-our-clients.html → http://chinatasteny.com/chips-and-soybeans.html → http://chinatasteny.com/cold-war-island-thaws.html → http://chinatasteny.com/committee-ended-age-of-engagement.html → http://chinatasteny.com/confused-about-chinas-belt-and-road-agenda-youre-not-alone.html → http://chinatasteny.com/conversation.html → http://chinatasteny.com/could-chinas-very-hot-summer-revive-action-climate-change.html → http://chinatasteny.com/crowded-beijing-revives-old-plan-new-overflow-city.html → http://chinatasteny.com/dalai-lamas-succession.html → http://chinatasteny.com/depth-of-field.html → http://chinatasteny.com/did-trump-just-start-trade-war-china.html → http://chinatasteny.com/donate.html → http://chinatasteny.com/donkey-business-worth-it-pakistan.html → http://chinatasteny.com/down-mountains.html → http://chinatasteny.com/earthbound-china.html → http://chinatasteny.com/east-china-sea-oil-tanker-burns-third-day-winds-high-waves-lash-rescuers.html → http://chinatasteny.com/economy.html → http://chinatasteny.com/education.html → http://chinatasteny.com/elizabeth-lo.html → http://chinatasteny.com/emma-belmonte.html → http://chinatasteny.com/energy.html → http://chinatasteny.com/environment-2.html → http://chinatasteny.com/environment.html → http://chinatasteny.com/europe-and-chinas-virtual-summit.html → http://chinatasteny.com/europes-china-policy-has-taken-sharp-turn-where-will-it-go-next.html → http://chinatasteny.com/eve-of-party-congress-whats-ahead-chinas-economy.html → http://chinatasteny.com/excerpts.html → http://chinatasteny.com/fateful-triangle.html → http://chinatasteny.com/features.html → http://chinatasteny.com/four-principles-guide-us-policy-toward-china.html → http://chinatasteny.com/has-covid-19-changed-how-chinas-leaders-approach-national-security.html → http://chinatasteny.com/health.html → http://chinatasteny.com/his-man-canton.html → http://chinatasteny.com/history.html → http://chinatasteny.com/hong-kongs-economic-future.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-can-us-maintain-global-leadership-science-and-technology.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-chinese-traders-both-help-and-hurt-local-merchants-ghana.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-could-us-deter-military-conflict-taiwan-strait.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-has-us-china-relationship-changed-under-biden.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-internet-works-and-how-china-censors-it.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-much-does-us-china-tension-threaten-decarbonization.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-much-has-trump-changed-his-position-china.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-much-will-new-stimulus-improve-chinas-economic-outlook.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-safe-chinas-food-light-of-fuel-tanker-cooking-oil-scandal.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-should-us-approach-climate-diplomacy-china.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-taming-mekong-could-give-china-unprecedented-power.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-well-china-advancing-its-interests-southeast-asia.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-will-eu-navigate-us-china-tensions.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-will-historians-look-back-coronavirus-outbreak.html → http://chinatasteny.com/how-will-trump-presidency-change-eu-china-relations.html → http://chinatasteny.com/huge-oil-spill-spreads-east-china-sea-stirring-environmental-fears.html → http://chinatasteny.com/human-resources-both-drive-and-limit-chinas-push-automation.html → http://chinatasteny.com/ian-johnson.html → http://chinatasteny.com/index.html → http://chinatasteny.com/infographics.html → http://chinatasteny.com/international-order-and-disorder.html → http://chinatasteny.com/isabel-hilton.html → http://chinatasteny.com/its-grim-out-there-chinas-economy-year-of-dragon.html → http://chinatasteny.com/james-palmer.html → http://chinatasteny.com/jeremy-goldkorn.html → http://chinatasteny.com/jiang-zemin-1926-2022.html → http://chinatasteny.com/journey-of-bra.html → http://chinatasteny.com/law.html → http://chinatasteny.com/letter-my-friend-under-quarantine-wuhan.html → http://chinatasteny.com/library.html → http://chinatasteny.com/living-rivers.html → http://chinatasteny.com/macron-arrives-beijing-whats-next-europe-and-china.html → http://chinatasteny.com/making-of-american-baby.html → http://chinatasteny.com/moving-2-million-people-beijings-urban-reset.html → http://chinatasteny.com/young-people-china-have-started-fashion-movement-built-around-nationalism-and-racial-purity.html
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:14 AM UTC

http://chinatasteny.com/regulators-leave-wealth-management-industry-unplugged.html

Directly observed · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/regulators-leave-wealth-management-industry-unplugged.html → form headed "Hands Off" → submits to http://chinatasteny.com/regulators-leave-wealth-management-industry-unplugged.html → purpose: contact (a field to write or be reached through)
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC

https://ws.sharethis.com/secure5x/index.html

Directly observed · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:16 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/beijing-putting-people-back-work-may-prove-tough-job.html → submits to https://ws.sharethis.com/secure5x/index.html → purpose: contact (a field to write or be reached through) → http://chinatasteny.com/chinafile-recommends.html → http://chinatasteny.com/contact.html → http://chinatasteny.com/generations-of-prc-leaders-world-alive-danger.html → http://chinatasteny.com/regulators-leave-wealth-management-industry-unplugged.html → http://chinatasteny.com/where-chinas-leaders-go-africa-may-surprise-you.html
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:16 AM UTC

http://chinatasteny.com/where-chinas-leaders-go-africa-may-surprise-you.html

Directly observed · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/where-chinas-leaders-go-africa-may-surprise-you.html → form headed "Recommendations" → submits to http://chinatasteny.com/where-chinas-leaders-go-africa-may-surprise-you.html → purpose: contact (a field to write or be reached through)
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC

http://chinatasteny.com/generations-of-prc-leaders-world-alive-danger.html

Directly observed · confirmed Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC
Observed via
http://chinatasteny.com/generations-of-prc-leaders-world-alive-danger.html → form headed "Haunted by Chaos" → submits to http://chinatasteny.com/generations-of-prc-leaders-world-alive-danger.html → purpose: contact (a field to write or be reached through)
First observed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC
Full contact-form data (JSON)

Locations

Where is ChinaFile located?

1 known location

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  • New York725 Park Ave., NY, 10021, US
Location evidence

The latest location collection is incomplete.

View location data

Menus evidence

Menu & Online Ordering

Menu & price evidence

Nothing observed in this category.

Channel pricing evidence

Channel pricing

View evidence
  • Channel presence at ChinaFile, 725 Park Ave.

    ChinaFile, 725 Park Ave. · the accepted location carrying the most storefront identities (0), with 0 of 27 platform menus read

    • Toastnot declared · 0/1 locations
    • Grubhubsearched, not found · 0/1 locations
    • Uber Eatssearch incomplete · 0/1 locations
    • DoorDashnot declared · 0/1 locations
    • ChowNownot declared · 0/1 locations
    • Olonot declared · 0/1 locations
    • SkyTabnot declared · 0/1 locations
    • Clovernot declared · 0/1 locations
    • Slicenot declared · 0/1 locations
    • KwickMenunot declared · 0/1 locations
    • Restolabs (onlineordering.io)not declared · 0/1 locations
    • CHOMPnot declared · 0/1 locations
    • OrderSave (Owner.com)not declared · 0/1 locations
    • SpotOnnot declared · 0/1 locations
    • TouchBistronot declared · 0/1 locations
    • Square Onlinenot declared · 0/1 locations
    • MenuSifunot declared · 0/1 locations
    • Menufynot declared · 0/1 locations
    • Dylishnot declared · 0/1 locations
    • getsaucenot declared · 0/1 locations
    • DoorDash Storefront (order.online)not declared · 0/1 locations
    • SpotHoppersearched, not found · 0/1 locations
    • ezCaternot declared · 0/1 locations
    • OpenTablenot declared · 0/1 locations

    One representative location per record: the accepted location carrying the most channel menus. Channel menus come from each provider's own store object for that store; prices are as each channel lists them, in the channel's currency; comparisons are projected from the resolved catalog -- one row per dish, portion-aware identity, prices kept as scoped offers -- and a pair the policy refuses is counted and explained rather than dropped.

    Derived from observations
    Observed via
    no channel menu was read for this location
    Interpreted by rule
    channel-pricing/1
    Evidence ID
    channel-pricing:873e3ed467de84c3a2d4053b

Website & Digital Technology

What powers ChinaFile's website?

Appears to use Drupal with PHP.

Who manages ChinaFile's domain and DNS?

chinatasteny.com was first registered on December 30, 2025. Its registrar is Gname.com Pte. Ltd..

What web infrastructure does ChinaFile use?

Protocols: HTTP/1.1.

Does ChinaFile use DNSSEC?

DNSSEC was not enabled when observed.

What marketing and analytics tools does ChinaFile's website use?

Mailchimp (email marketing). Google Analytics 4 (GA4).

View technology, DNS, network and security evidence

More website details

View mail records and evidence

Mail records: Nothing observed in this category.

Apps, Loyalty & Guest Technology

View apps, provider accounts and technical evidence

App store details: Nothing observed in this category.

Publisher files

Nothing observed in this category.

Feeds

Nothing observed in this category.

GitHub

Nothing observed in this category.

Additional site intelligence

Useful site-graph evidence is available on demand instead of being pre-rendered into every company profile.